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Introduction
Imagine that you describe to someone Singer’s argument for the conclusion that many of us are morally obligated to donate to charity.​[1]​ The person to whom you present that argument can respond in several ways. First, they can accept the conclusion. Second, they can reject the conclusion. But a third possibility is that they are thrown into doubt about that conclusion.
If they are thrown into doubt (and can’t resolve that doubt quickly), then they can practically respond to their doubt in different ways. On the one hand, they can maintain that they’re not going to donate until they’re convinced of the truth of Singer’s conclusion. But, on the other hand, they can reason in the following way:
“Either Singer’s conclusion is true or false. If it’s true, then I need to give more money away. But even if it’s false, no harm will be done by giving money away that I would have spent only on trivial things. So I’ll give more of my money away, even though I’m not convinced that I’m morally required to.”
This type of reasoning raises two questions. First, because this type of reasoning might seem morally admirable, it raises the question: What are the moral norms governing deliberation under moral uncertainty? And second, because this type of reasoning might seem like a reasonable way of making decisions when one is morally uncertain, it raises the question: What are the rational norms governing deliberation under moral uncertainty? Although both questions are important, in this paper I will only address the second. However, I won’t provide a complete answer to the second question. I have two aims. First, I aim to vindicate some instances of the type of reasoning described above. Second, I aim to motivate the idea that the second question is a meaningful, potentially fruitful question for philosophers to address. I will work toward these aims by arguing that moral uncertainty can, in fact, affect what it’s rational for one to do.
In section 1, I begin by clarifying the concept of moral uncertainty. Then, in section 2, I begin my defense of:
Moral Sensitivity: rational obligations are “sensitive” to (morally-based) moral uncertainty. (That is, moral uncertainty can affect what it’s rational for one to do.)
I argue that when one is morally uncertain but (a) cares about acting in accordance with moral norms and (b) is presented with an action that “dominates” all other available actions, then one is rationally obligated to choose in accordance with the principle of dominance. In section 3, I consider what one’s rational obligations are when one is morally uncertain but no available action dominates (“no-dominance” cases). I argue that, given the rational requirement to reason in accordance with dominance, it’s implausible to think that moral uncertainty never affects one’s rational obligations in no-dominance cases. I then describe the problem of value comparison, which allegedly undermines Moral Sensitivity. In section 4, I argue that the problem of value comparison, as raised in the moral uncertainty literature, is an instance of a general puzzle about rationality. Other instances of the puzzle do not show that non-moral uncertainty doesn’t affect our rational obligations. Thus, this instance of the puzzle shouldn’t convince us that moral uncertainty doesn’t affect our rational obligations. In section 5, I address the objection that my position relies on an overly optimistic view of the capacities of everyday decision-makers. I conclude by surveying several questions raised by my position.
1. Moral Uncertainty
Uncertainty is an epistemic state in which one’s credences are “split” between mutually exclusive propositions. In this paper, I will assume that the type of uncertainty one experiences is determined by the type of propositions that one’s credences are split between. Thus, moral uncertainty is a state in which one’s credences are split between mutually exclusive moral propositions.​[2]​
(The reader might object to this way of delineating types of uncertainty, on the grounds that there is no clear distinction between types of propositions. I’m sympathetic to this concern, but I will nevertheless assume a distinction between moral and non-moral propositions. This is because, if one dispenses with that assumption, then one can arrive at my conclusion—that Moral Sensitivity is true—easily. Thus, I will burden myself with that assumption, and show that even with that assumption one can still defend Moral Sensitivity.)
There can be different reasons why one’s credences are split between mutually exclusive moral propositions. On the one hand, one might be morally uncertain because of prior uncertainty about a non-moral claim. For example, I might be uncertain about whether or not I should lie to someone, but only because I’m uncertain about whether or not I could lie convincingly—in that case, my moral uncertainty reduces to uncertainty about a descriptive claim. On the other hand, one might be morally uncertain because of prior uncertainty about another moral claim; I might be uncertain about whether or not to lie to someone because I’m uncertain about whether lying is intrinsically morally wrong. So, we must distinguish between descriptively-based and morally-based moral uncertainty.
Because there are different types of moral propositions—propositions that express normative theories, axiological claims, and claims about particular moral obligations and permissions—we can further distinguish between different types of morally-based moral uncertainty. In this paper, when I use the phrase “moral uncertainty,” it will usually refer to morally-based moral uncertainty about the true normative theory. However, my argument also applies to the other types of morally-based moral uncertainty. The reason my argument is applicable to all forms of morally-based moral uncertainty is this: I will argue that we should treat morally-based moral uncertainty in the same way that we treat descriptively-based moral uncertainty, because the source of moral uncertainty is irrelevant. Given that the source of moral uncertainty is irrelevant, it follows that the source of morally-based moral uncertainty is also irrelevant.
It’s not controversial that one should take one’s descriptively-based moral uncertainty into account when deliberating—that’s an issue on which my opponents and I agree. For example, if one is uncertain about whether it’s permissible to shoot at a target, but only because one is uncertain about whether there is a toddler playing near the target, then most agree that one’s descriptively-based moral uncertainty (combined with the fact that one doesn’t want to shoot a toddler) entails that one is rationally obligated to refrain from shooting, all else being equal. The focus of this paper is whether morally-based moral uncertainty affects what one rationally ought to do in the same way that descriptively-based moral uncertainty affects what one rationally ought to do.
2. Moral Uncertainty and Dominance
To begin, I will provide some positive motivation for Moral Sensitivity, the view that morally-based moral uncertainty can affect what it’s rational for one to do. I will argue for moral weak dominance, the view that when one is morally uncertain but one available action weakly dominates the others, then one is rationally required to choose the dominating action. (I will argue for this under the assumption that one cares about acting in accordance with moral norms. If one doesn’t care about moral norms, then one’s moral uncertainty doesn’t affect the rationality of one’s action. To see this, consider a person who doesn’t care about whether or not they get rained on; all else being equal, there will be no rational norms governing that person’s decision about whether to take an umbrella with them on their walk.)
An action A weakly dominates another action B if and only if (1) under every state of nature, A yields an outcome at least as good as the outcome B yields and (2) under at least one state of nature, A yields a better outcome than B. Everyone agrees that one ought to comply with weak dominance when uncertain about descriptive propositions. For example, imagine that I’m trying to decide whether to take an umbrella with me to work. If it rains, then carrying the umbrella with me is better than leaving it at home. And if it doesn’t rain, the umbrella is nevertheless light enough that I won’t notice it. Thus, because it will either rain or not rain (those being the two possible states of nature), carrying the umbrella weakly dominates not bringing an umbrella with me; carrying the umbrella is sure to yield a result that is as great as or better than not bringing it with me.
We can apply weak dominance to some cases moral uncertainty (in which the propositions expressing the states of nature are moral propositions). So, for example, imagine that I’m uncertain about whether Kantianism or Utilitarianism is true, and I’m trying to decide whether or not to steal my neighbor’s television. It turns out that according to each theory, I shouldn’t steal my neighbor’s television—not stealing my neighbor’s television leads to an outcome morally as good as or better than stealing the television, no matter which theory is true. In that case, not stealing weakly dominates stealing. Thus, we can apply dominance-style reasoning when deliberating under moral uncertainty. But should we?
Here is an argument that we should:
1.	We should reason in accordance with weak dominance when uncertain about descriptive propositions (such as propositions about whether or not it will rain).
2.	Weak dominance is insensitive (for the most part​[3]​) to the content of the propositions that express the states of nature.
3.	So, if we should reason in accordance with weak dominance when uncertain about one type of proposition (e.g., descriptive), then we should reason in accordance with weak dominance when uncertain about propositions of other types. (2)
4.	So, we should reason in accordance with weak dominance when we’re uncertain about moral propositions. (1, 3)

I think that the conclusion expressed by (4) is correct. Some philosophers disagree with me about (4), but that’s because they are working with non-standard—and, I think, unmotivated—definitions of dominance.​[4]​ So, we have our first piece of motivation for Moral Sensitivity: moral uncertainty affects one’s rational obligations when one available action dominates the others.
The problem, however, is that this conclusion isn’t practically interesting. The interesting cases of moral uncertainty—the cases that we usually face, and also the cases that are worth worrying about—are those in which no available action even weakly dominates the others. Thus, although one ought to perform whichever action weakly dominates, the rule of weak dominance will rarely apply to actual circumstances.​[5]​ I will refer to cases of moral uncertainty in which no action dominates as “no-dominance” cases.
3. Moral Uncertainty Without Dominance
I will argue that we have good reason to think that moral uncertainty affects one’s rational obligations in some no-dominance cases; however, it turns out that the way in which this happens is dependent on one’s specific preferences. Moreover, in some no-dominance cases, one lacks rational obligations. Nevertheless, we should not infer from this complexity (or from the lack of rational obligations in some instances of moral uncertainty) that moral uncertainty never affects one’s rational obligations in no-dominance cases.
I’ll develop my argument by considering two possibilities. First, it could be that one’s moral uncertainty never affects what one rationally ought to do in no-dominance cases. Second, it could be that one’s moral uncertainty sometimes affects what one rationally ought to do in no-dominance cases. I’ll argue against the first possibility, and then defend the second possibility from the problem of value comparison.
3.1 The First Possibility: We Have No Rational Obligations in No-Dominance Cases
One natural thought is that the choice a morally-motivated person rationally ought to make in no-dominance cases is determined by (a) their credence-levels in the competing moral propositions and (b) how morally valuable, for each of those propositions, their available actions would be if that proposition were true.​[6]​ This natural thought suggests that we extend utility theory to cover cases of “moral risk” in which no available action dominates the others.​[7]​
As we’ll see in section 3.2, some philosophers reject this natural thought because of the problem of value comparison. They then infer the falsehood of Moral Sensitivity from the failure of utility theory to adequately address decision-making under moral uncertainty; they think that one’s rational obligation in no-dominance cases are determined by one’s descriptive beliefs, but not by one’s moral beliefs, and they thereby endorse the first possibility:
Possibility 1: in no-dominance cases, one’s moral uncertainty never affects what one rationally ought to do (even if one cares about satisfying moral norms).
My argument against the first possibility proceeds from the claim (argued for in section 2) that moral uncertainty affects one’s rational obligations in cases of dominance. We shouldn’t accept this first possibility—at least, not without a very persuasive argument—because we don’t typically believe that there’s a drastic difference between dominance and no-dominance cases when dealing with other types of uncertainty. Consider the case in which I’m trying to decide whether to carry my umbrella with me, and it would be very mildly annoying to carry it in the event that it doesn’t rain. No one would say that there are no longer any rational norms governing my choice. After all, the probability of rain might be high, and I might greatly prefer to not get rained on. In light of those considerations, it would be worth risking a mild annoyance—I would be irrational if I were to risk a very high probability of something I hate only for the sake of avoiding an improbable slight annoyance. So, because we don’t believe that rational norms vanish in no-dominance cases involving non-moral uncertainty, we need a good reason for thinking that that’s what happens with moral uncertainty.
I infer that the burden of proof falls on those who think that (1) we have rational obligations to reason in accordance with dominance when morally uncertain, but that (2) moral uncertainty is irrelevant (with respect to rationality) in no-dominance cases. In the remainder of this paper I’ll examine and respond to an attempt to take up that burden.
3.2 The Problem of Value Comparison
I endorse the second possibility:
Possibility 2: in some no-dominance cases, one’s moral uncertainty affects what one rationally ought to do (if one cares about satisfying moral norms).
This second possibility is supported by the failure of the first possibility. However, the second possibility faces the problem of value comparison. The following description of the problem of value comparison relies heavily on Brian Hedden’s presentation of the objection.​[8]​ However, my response to the problem applies equally to other presentations of the objection.​[9]​
Let’s begin with a brief description of the problem of value comparison. In order for a morally concerned person to take into account (in the course of deliberation) that they are uncertain between several moral propositions, they would need to determine the “expected moral value” of each of their available actions. To do this, they would need to determine how morally valuable each available action would be under each state of nature (where each state of nature is expressed by one of those moral propositions), and then weight those values according to their credence-level in each proposition. However, there’s no guarantee that an action’s moral value under the assumption of one moral proposition is comparable to that action’s moral value under the assumption of another moral proposition.​[10]​
However, this brief way of putting the problem is not adequate; it’s not clear what’s meant by “comparable,” and even if we fix the type of comparability that’s at stake it’s still not clear why we get a failure of comparability. At this point, it will be helpful to work with a distinction between comparability and commensurability that’s similar in spirit to Chang’s distinction. Things are comparable just in case it is possible to ordinally rank them, that is, just in case it’s possible to determine that one is greater than, equal to, or less than the other.​[11]​ Things are commensurable just in case it’s possible to cardinally rank them, that is, just in case it’s possible to “precisely” rank them “by some unit of value.”​[12]​ In this paper, I will say that things are commensurable when they can be ranked on the same interval scale.
There are two things to notice about these definitions. First, on this understanding of the comparability/commensurability distinction, comparability does not entail commensurability (and incommensurability does not entail incomparability). For example, you might think that the value of someone’s privacy being respected is more morally valuable than the small thrill you would get from prying into that person’s affairs, even if you think that the value of privacy can’t be represented using the same units used to represent happiness (or even if you think that the values of privacy and happiness can’t be represented by units of measurement at all). Second, a set of alternatives are only comparable/commensurable relative to some value (which Chang calls a “covering value”). So, for example, we can compare going bowling and going mountain-climbing with respect to many different values: with respect to the fun the activity will produce for me, with respect to the money the activity will cost, with respect to how safe the activity is, and so on.
With these clarifications in place, we can attempt to more clearly state the problem of value comparison: the moral value of action A under the assumption that moral proposition p is true is not commensurable to the moral value of A under the assumption that moral proposition q is true (where p and q are mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, and act-independent). As a result, it’s not clear how we could determine the “expected moral value” of performing A. We face the same problem when attempting to determine the expected moral value of any of our available actions, and thus we are unable to determine which available action has the highest expected moral value. Some philosophers infer from this that there is no action that one is rationally required to choose under moral uncertainty. This gives us a clearer statement of the problem—the problem is, in fact, a problem of commensurability. But how can we motivate it?
Hedden motivates the problem in two ways. First, he argues that the value functions we associate with different moral theories are the results of different sets of “preferences,” and thus the theories’ evaluations of actions are not commensurable. Second, he argues that not all theories can be assigned a value function. (Hedden uses the phrase “value function” instead of “utility function,” presumably because it sounds strange to say that an outcome can have utility for a theory. However, Hedden’s “value functions” just are utility functions, since we’re treating “utility” as simply the value given by a function that represents a certain type of ordinal ranking of lotteries. Thus, I will continue to use the phrase “utility function,” even when referring to those functions that represent the preferences of moral theories.)
To understand Hedden’s first argument, we first need to understand how we can assign a utility function to a theory. The idea is that a moral theory expresses a set of “preferences”—an ordinal rankings of lotteries (including actions)​[13]​—to which we can apply a representation theorem, assuming that those preferences satisfy certain requirements.​[14]​ That is, assuming that a theory ordinally ranks lotteries in the right sort of way, we can represent that theory as recommending that one act so as to maximize some value, where that value can be numerically represented on an interval scale. One might wonder: how could we numerically represent how valuable lotteries are, according to a moral theory? The idea is this: we can “set the interval scale” for that theory by looking at the lotteries that the theory ordinally ranks the highest and the lowest. The highest-ranking lotteries mark the top of the scale, while the lowest-ranking lotteries mark the bottom of the scale. We can set those top and bottom values however we like. Then, again assuming that the theory has the right sorts of preferences over lotteries, we can determine where all other lotteries fall on that scale. In this way, we can numerically represent the utility of any lottery (and thus any action) according to the theory.​[15]​
Let’s imagine that we represent two competing moral theories using two different utility functions, and that we thereby determine the (numerically represented) moral value of available actions according to each of those two theories. One might think that we can then use those numerical representations of the moral values of actions to determine the expected moral value of each available action; that is, one might think that we can look at how valuable each action would be if each moral theory were true, and then weight those values using our credence-levels in each theory. However: how we set each of the theory’s interval scales will affect our calculation of the expected moral value of our actions, and it isn’t reasonable to assume that we ought to set the scales in the same way (using the same numerical values to represent the top and bottom of each theory’s scale).​[16]​ Thus, the evaluations of actions provided by competing moral theories aren’t commensurable, and so any calculation of expected moral value will be meaningless.
Hedden considers several solutions to the problem of value comparison. Lockhart, for instance, attempts to solve the problem by introducing the principle of equity among moral theories (PEMT), according to which “The maximum degrees of moral rightness of all possible actions in a situation according to competing moral theories should be considered equal. The minimum degrees of moral rightness of possible actions in a situation according to competing theories should be considered equal unless all possible actions are equally right according to one of the theories (in which case all of the actions should be considered to be maximally right according to that theory).”​[17]​ However, PEMT is implausible.​[18]​ Imagine that I’m uncertain between Kantian deontology, on the one hand, and a theory according to which some actions are only a little bit better or worse than other actions, on the other hand. We could call the latter theory the “Meh” theory. Clearly, there will be some situations in which Kantianism and the Meh theory do not hold that there are equal amounts of moral value at stake.
Sepielli shows​[19]​ that one can compare the utility functions of competing theories if one also has a sufficiently large set of background beliefs (beliefs that establish points of comparison between the theories). However, Hedden points out that one will often lack a sufficiently large set of such beliefs, and that certain sets of background beliefs could actually yield contradictory comparisons between theories.​[20]​
Ross and Riedener show that one can compare the utility functions of theories if one has some pre-existing beliefs about how to choose rationally when morally uncertain. That is, both Ross and Riedener argue that having intuitions about how to compare the moral values of some actions according to several moral theories can provide one with enough information to compare those theories’ utility functions, and thus to compare the evaluations delivered by the theories in less obvious cases.​[21]​ Hedden, however, claims to lack any intuitions of that sort, and thus rejects this proposal on the grounds that it fails to offer prescriptions for how to act rationally under moral uncertainty without presupposing some facts about how we rationally ought to act under moral uncertainty.​[22]​
Hedden’s second source of motivation for the problem of value comparison proceeds from the observation that it isn’t possible to apply a representation theorem to every moral theory, because some moral theories have “preferences” that make the application of such a theorem impossible.​[23]​ For example, moral nihilism denies the existence of moral values, and thus does not ordinally rank outcomes with respect to moral value; and, of course, if a theory does not ordinally rank lotteries, then we cannot represent it using a utility function.​[24]​ And if we can’t represent a theory using a utility function, then we can’t numerically represent how valuable outcomes are according to that theory. Thus, in these cases, we again can’t calculate the expected moral value of an action.​[25]​
4. Responding to the Problem of Value Comparison
I will defend Moral Sensitivity from the problem of value comparison by arguing that there does not need to be an action with the “highest expected moral value” in order for there to be rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty. I will first describe why it’s incorrect to infer from the problem of value comparison that Moral Sensitivity is false. I will then illustrate why this is a bad inference by examining a case of descriptive uncertainty that’s analogous to a “no-dominance” case of moral uncertainty. I’ll end this section by locating the source of confusion about the problem of value comparison.
4.1 The Two Roles of Representation Theorems
Representation theorems play two roles in helping us understand rational choice under moral uncertainty. First, we can (in some cases) apply a representation theorem to the preferences of a theory, and thereby represent that theory using a utility function that tells us how that theory ranks lotteries on an interval scale. Second, we can (in some cases) apply a representation theorem to the preferences of a person (the decision-maker), and thereby represent that person using a utility function that tells us how that person ranks lotteries on an interval scale.
The problem of value comparison is a problem for the first role of representation theorems; the problem is that even if we can associate utility functions with competing moral theories, those functions only deliver rankings on distinct interval scales. As a result, there’s no meaningful way of determining the “expected moral value” of an action. This is an interesting result: in at least some cases, there is no expected moral value that we can assign to an action when we’re morally uncertain.
However, it doesn’t follow from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty; this is because even if the evaluations delivered by competing theories aren’t commensurable, the decision-maker can still ordinally rank lotteries (including lotteries over the possible outcomes of decisions made under moral uncertainty) and can assign utilities to the possible outcomes of their choice. It is those utilities—not the evaluations of actions provided by the competing moral theories—that determine which action has the highest expected utility for the decision-maker. Thus, although the problem of value comparison is a problem if one wants to perform whichever action has the highest expected moral value, it is not a problem for a decision-maker who cares about acting morally and can ordinally rank lotteries.
To summarize so far: the problem of value comparison illustrates that the evaluations of actions provided by competing moral theories are not commensurable. However, that incommensurability does not entail that the decision-maker cannot compare lotteries (including the actions that one must decide between under moral uncertainty) and thereby be represented by a utility function. This conclusion is negative, since I’ve only shown the failure of an entailment relation.
However, we have reason to think that there are, in fact, rational norms governing choice in no-dominance cases. There are two observations that support this stronger conclusion. First, in cases of moral uncertainty, the states of nature expressed by moral propositions must be mutually exclusive. And second, the problem of value comparison is analogous to the problem of interpersonal utility comparison.
To see the first point, consider an example described by Ross:​[26]​


	Singer’s Theory (0.5)	Traditional Morality (0.5)
Order Veal	Bad	Permissible
Order Veggie Wrap	Not So Bad	Permissible


Perhaps we can’t associate the competing moral views with utility functions, or perhaps we can but the evaluations of actions provided by the theories aren’t commensurable. My earlier, negative conclusion is that it doesn’t follow from either of those possibilities that a decision-maker can’t compare (ordinally rank) lotteries in such a way that allows them to assign values to the outcomes above. However, we have good reason to think that a decision-maker can ordinally rank lotteries over these outcomes, at least in many cases—this is because the evaluations provided by the theories must be comparable if the competing moral theories are theories about the same thing. If the two theories are theories of different types of values (incomparable values, no less), then the theories are not actually in competition with each other; two theories with very different structures can both be true, so long as they’re theories about different things. (For example, we can accept both a psychologist’s theory of clinical depression and a physicist’s theory of gravity in spite of their deep structural differences, because they’re theories of different things; they’re not mutually exclusive.) When one is uncertain between mutually exclusive moral propositions, one must be uncertain between moral propositions that express “different takes” on the same thing. This observation supports the idea that in genuine cases of moral uncertainty, it is possible to compare what each moral proposition has to say about an action.​[27]​ Exactly what it is that competing theories disagree about will depend on the theories in question;​[28]​ nevertheless, genuinely competing theories must provide comparable evaluations of actions, even if those evaluations aren’t commensurable. Thus, a morally uncertain person can reasonably compare lotteries over the outcomes of actions, even when the moral theories’ evaluations of actions aren’t commensurable.​[29]​




Kayaking	More Happy 	Less Happy







Note, however, that the numbers in the decision matrix above do not represent the utility of each outcome for you, the decision-maker. They represent how your possible dates would feel about the outings. Moreover, we can’t assume that both of your dates are using the same interval scale to evaluate the outings. As a result, we cannot determine which action has the highest expectation of making your date happy. But it doesn’t follow that there is no way for you to rationally choose what to do—this is because what’s rational for you to do, according to traditional decision theory, depends on your preferences over lotteries, not just the preferences (or utility functions) of your possible dates. And that’s true even if you’re motivated to find an activity that your date will enjoy.
To see how this works in the blind date scenario, imagine that you know Frances thinks that kayaking is the worst, whereas Frankie prefers kayaking but would tolerate the museum, too. You could have a perfectly rational preference—by the lights of decision-theory—for going to the museum. That is, your preference for the museum-going lottery could be perfectly consistent with all of your other preferences over lotteries. The point here is this: so long as you can rank lotteries (including lotteries over these outcomes) in the right sort of way, then there can still be an available action that has the highest expected utility for you even though there’s no action that, in a formal sense, has the highest expectation of making your date happy.
Similarly, what’s rational for you to do in cases of moral uncertainty is determined by your preferences over lotteries, not by the preferences of the moral theories you’re uncertain between. The incommensurability of outcomes with respect to some value—such as moral value—doesn’t entail that you, the decision-maker, can’t ordinally rank lotteries over those outcomes.
Notice: this doesn’t mean that decision theory “tells you what to do” when you’re morally uncertain. That’s because in order for there to be an action that has the highest expected utility for you, you already have to have a certain type of set of preferences over lotteries, and that set will include the lotteries you’re deciding between in cases of moral uncertainty. But it’s true of all forms of uncertainty that decision theory doesn’t tell you what to do when you don’t already know what to do—this isn’t anything unusual about moral uncertainty.
Thus, the problem of value comparison is analogous to the problem of interpersonal utility comparison (which involves a type of descriptive uncertainty). But we don’t infer from the problem of interpersonal utility comparison that rational norms aren’t “sensitive” to descriptive uncertainty. Similarly, we shouldn’t infer from the problem of value comparison that rational norms aren’t sensitive to moral uncertainty. That is, we shouldn’t infer that Moral Sensitivity is false.
4.2 Locating the Source of the Confusion about Value Comparison
Philosophers take the problem of value comparison to entail the non-existence of rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty because they slide between the (a) incommensurability of the action-evaluations delivered by competing moral theories and (b) the incomparability of lotteries over outcomes in instances of moral uncertainty. This slide takes place because of a failure to distinguish between the utility functions used to represent the theories and the utility function used to represent the decision-maker.
In “The Infectiousness of Nihilism,” William MacAskill argues that Jacob Ross fails to show that a decision-maker can rationally ignore “uniform” moral theories—theories according to which all available actions are equally morally valuable or disvaluable—when deliberating about what to do. MacAskill uses the example of nihilism, construed as the view that no actions have moral value or disvalue, to attack Ross’ argument. He writes,
According to nihilism, no positive value relation obtains between any two options [i.e., actions]. That is, the value of every option is undefined.
However, if the value of every option is undefined, according to nihilism, then, for any decision maker with nonzero credence in nihilism, there is a big problem for her if she attempts to incorporate moral uncertainty into her reasoning about expected value. The problem is as follows. If we take an expectation over possible states of nature, taking the sum, for each state of nature, of the value of that state of nature multiplied by its probability, and the value of one state of nature is undefined, then the expectation as a whole is undefined. Because, according to nihilism, the value of every option is undefined, for a decision maker with nonzero credence in nihilism, the expected value of every option is undefined, too. Nonzero credence in nihilism is therefore sufficient to infect practical reason, resulting in there being no subjective reason for preferring any option over any other.​[31]​
Everything in the passage above is true—except for the final sentence. It’s true that if one of the possible states of nature is moral nihilism, then there is no “expected moral value” that one can maximize. However, as we’ve seen, it doesn’t follow from this that there are no norms that could govern one’s choice. Consider the following, only slightly modified example from Ross:

	Singer’s Theory (0.5)	Nihilism (0.5)
Order Veal	Bad	Doesn’t Matter
Order Veggie Wrap	Not So Bad	Doesn’t Matter

Even though the outcomes in this situation cannot be assigned units of moral value (and even though, as a result, there is no action that has the highest expected moral value), there could still be an action that has the highest expected utility for the decision maker—that just requires that the decision-maker ordinally ranks lotteries (including lotteries over the outcomes in this choice situation) in the right sort of way. One doesn’t need to be able to describe outcomes numerically in order to have preferences over lotteries involving those outcomes. Thus, the fact that nihilism doesn’t assign moral values to actions doesn’t entail that there is “no subjective reason for preferring any option over any other.”
Hedden, too, confuses the non-existence of an action that has the “highest expected moral value” with the non-existence of an action that has the highest expected utility for the decision-maker. Hedden begins his paper with a view he calls the MITE (Maximize InterTheoretic Expectation) view of the super-subjective ought​[32]​:
Given the attractiveness of the expected value maximization framework for theorizing about the subjective ought, it is tempting to try to extend it to the super-subjective ought. If it is possible to represent all moral theories in expected value terms..., then there is an apparently straightforward way in which to extend the expected value framework to deal with moral uncertainty as well. Expected moral value (EMV) is an intratheoretical notion. When we take the expected moral value of an action on each moral theory and sum them up, weighted by the probability of each theory, we get an intertheoretical notion, which we can call the ‘intertheoretic expectation.’...
Now, the proposal is that what you super-subjectively ought to do is to make-true the act-proposition with the highest intertheoretic expectation.​[33]​
Hedden then attacks MITE in the ways we’ve already seen; in cases of moral uncertainty, there is no action with the highest intertheoretic expectation. And, Hedden is correct to conclude that MITE fails, at least in many cases—for reasons that are now familiar, we should not say that one always rationally ought to maximize expected moral value when one is morally uncertain. But Hedden goes on to assert that,
[W]hen it comes to trying to devise a formal theory of what you super-subjectively ought to do, MITE (or some slight variant thereof) is the only game in town. This is important, since if MITE ultimately fails, as I will argue it does, then this casts serious doubt on the prospects for coming up with any formal theory of what you super-subjectively ought to do.​[34]​
We can see that Hedden infers from the failure of MITE that there can be no theory of what one super-subjectively ought to do, that is, no theory of how one rationally ought to respond to moral uncertainty. This is because, as Hedden writes, “MITE, and probably any plausible theory of the super-subjective ought, requires that the different moral theories in which an agent has some credence be translated into a common currency so as to allow them to be weighed against each other,”​[35]​ and the problem of value comparison makes such a common currency between moral theories impossible. However, as we’ve already seen, there need not be any “common currency” between moral theories in order for there to be facts about what one rationally ought to do when morally uncertain; all that’s required for the existence of such facts is that the decision-maker has the proper sort of ordinal ranking of lotteries. Thus, we should not conclude, as Hedden does, that “[t]he default position should be that there are no rules for how to act in light of moral uncertainty; beliefs about descriptive matters make a difference to how you ought to act, while beliefs about moral matters do not.”​[36]​
I should highlight that my response to Hedden is distinct from the solution Ross offers in “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism.”​[37]​ Hedden describes Ross’ strategy as “start[ing] with facts about what agents super-subjectively ought to do in certain cases and us[ing] those facts to reverse-engineer the desired intertheoretic value comparison,”​[38]​ and Hedden rejects this strategy because he doesn’t have any intuitions about facts concerning what agents super-subjectively ought to do.”​[39]​ (Note that Ross’ solution to the problem of value comparison is analogous to Harsanyi’s solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparison, and thus is subject to the same sorts of objections.​[40]​) My response to Hedden is different; I’m not describing a way of determining which of one’s actions has the highest expected moral value. Instead, my response to the problem of value comparison consists in the observation that in order for some action to have the highest expected utility for a decision-maker, that decision-maker only has to ordinally rank lotteries in the right sort of way; such a ranking does not require that the theories one is uncertain between deliver commensurable evaluations of actions.
5. Objection: An Actual Decision-Maker Can’t Reasonably Compare These Outcomes
My response to the problem of value comparison relies on the assumption that we can represent the decision-maker using a utility function and that, as a result, there are rational norms governing what the decision-maker decides (even when the states of nature are expressed by moral propositions). But the reader might worry that a decision-maker can’t compare lotteries over possible outcomes of choices made under moral uncertainty, and thus can’t be represented by such a function.
One version of this objection comes from the familiar concern that most people cannot ordinally rank lotteries in the way required to be represented by a utility function. More specifically, a set of preferences must be complete in order to be represented by a single utility function, and actual decision-makers do not have complete preferences. (One’s preferences are “complete” when one can ordinally rank all lotteries, that is, when, for any two lotteries A and B, one prefers A to B, prefers B to A, or is indifferent between A and B.) The reader might worry that, according to decision theory, one must be representable by a unique​[41]​ utility function in order to count as rational. And since an agent’s preferences must be complete in order to be representable by a unique utility function, the reader might worry that an agent with incomplete preferences is not (at least by the lights of decision theory) a rational agent to whom rational norms apply. 
However, we need not assume that an agent must be representable by a unique utility function in order to count as rational, and thus we need not assume that one must have complete preferences in order for rational norms to apply to them. When an agent has incomplete preferences, they cannot be represented by a unique utility function; however, they can be represented by a set of utility functions. Moreover, in many cases, the utility functions in that set will significantly overlap—that is, an agent with incomplete preferences will still nevertheless have utility functions that “agree” about what to do in some cases. In those cases in which one’s utility functions agree, one is subject to rational norms. Thus: even if there are some cases in which one is not rationally obligated to act in any way in particular because of incomplete preferences, it doesn’t follow that such a person is never subject to any rational norms. The fact that a morally uncertain person has incomplete preferences does not entail that there are no rational norms that are sensitive to their moral uncertainty.
A second version of this objection comes from acceptance of a different conception of rationality. According to this version of the objection, decision theory gets rationality wrong; the rational requirements decision theory describes are not in fact rational requirements, and the real rational requirements don’t apply to cases of moral uncertainty. Note that this version of the objection shifts the target of the problem of value comparison. The problem of value comparison in the moral uncertainty literature has been a problem concerning the impossibility of providing a formal framework for rational decision-making under moral uncertainty. But this version of the objection says that even if that problem has been solved, there nevertheless remains a related problem.
I’m not optimistic about the prospects for this sort of objection. Note that this objection can’t simply assert that the conception of rationality assumed by decision theory is “too thin” (that is, it can’t simply rely on adding to the requirements of rationality described by decision theory). Instead, the objection has to show that (a) decision theory is demanding things of agents that rationality doesn’t actually demand, and that (b) there are other, incompatible rational requirements that aren’t operative in cases of moral uncertainty. The appropriate response to this second version of the objection will depend on which constraints on rationality the objector wants to introduce. For the purposes of this paper, I’m happy to only argue that one can be subject to decision theoretic rational requirements (which amount to a consistency requirement) when deciding under moral uncertainty.
For those readers who remain convinced that there’s no reasonable way of comparing the outcomes of a choice made under moral uncertainty, I’d like to make two points. First, we regularly make such comparisons in ways that seem reasonable. Second, even if there are some cases in which we can’t make these comparisons, there still can be rational norms governing choice in other cases of moral uncertainty.
For an example of a case of moral uncertainty in which reasonable comparisons of lotteries over outcomes are clearly possible, consider again the example introduced earlier, in which you must choose what to do when you have some credence in moral nihilism:

	Singer’s Theory (0.5)	Nihilism (0.5)
Order Veal	Bad	Doesn’t Matter
Order Veggie Wrap	Not So Bad	Doesn’t Matter

It may be that no available action has a highest expected moral value in this case, because of the problem of value comparison. But that fact doesn’t prevent the decision-maker from reasonably preferring the Veggie Wrap option to the Veal option, given that they want to avoid the outcome in which they order the veal and Singer is correct.
To elaborate further on my first point, we can reasonably make such comparisons when dealing with interpersonal utility. (You’ll recall that cases of interpersonal utility comparison are analogous to cases of value comparison.) Let’s say that you have two friends, Eva and Evan. They’re your friends, and so you’d like to benefit them. For some reason, you have to choose between giving Eva an ice cream cone and giving Evan an ice cream cone. Eva says that she would really enjoy the ice cream cone, and Evan says that he doesn’t like ice cream. Given these details, it’s clear what the rational course of action is: you should give Eva the ice cream cone. This isn’t because giving Eva the ice cream cone maximizes expected (interpersonal) utility, since we can assume for the purposes of this example that there is no such notion; the utility functions representing Eva and Evan are incommensurable. Nevertheless, even though the levels of utility Eva will get from the ice cream cone aren’t commensurable to the levels of utility Evan would get from the ice cream cone, you can still make a reasonable judgment about which outcome is better—it’s better that Eva get the ice cream cone. (This is analogous to a case in which you’re forced to decide between respecting someone’s privacy and getting a small thrill from prying into their affairs; even if your utility function isn’t commensurable to theirs, you can still reasonably judge that it’s better to respect their privacy than to get the thrill.)
These sorts of examples are artificial and simple; one might worry about tougher cases of moral uncertainty in which it really isn’t clear how the decision-maker can compare lotteries over the outcomes. I’m sure there are such cases; but all that those cases show is that the decision-maker has incomplete preferences. And, as we’ve seen, the fact that a decision-maker has incomplete preferences does not entail that the decision-maker isn’t subject to rational norms in some cases (namely, those cases in which the set of utility functions used to represent the decision-maker “agree” about what the decision-maker should do). Consider the example in which you’re planning for a blind date. If you suffer from an incompleteness of preferences that makes it impossible to decide which outing to plan, then utility theory remains silent on what you should do in that case. But note: we should not infer from this that there are never rational norms governing how we should plan for blind dates. To use Hedden’s language, we should not infer that there are no “oughts” that are “sensitive” to our beliefs about who our dates will be. Similarly, the fact that utility theory remains silent on what one rationally ought to do in some cases of moral uncertainty does not entail that one never has rational obligations that are sensitive to moral beliefs.
Conclusion: Four Questions
To conclude, I’d like to briefly survey several questions that my position raises.
First: How should we make decisions under moral uncertainty when we don’t already have the right sorts of preferences over lotteries? All that I’ve shown in this paper is that a formal problem in decision theory should not lead us to reject Moral Sensitivity; but, unfortunately, nothing in my argument describes the right sort of procedure for forming preferences. This is an issue on which traditional decision theory is (mostly) silent. However, I hope to have motivated this question; I hope to have shown that this is a question that philosophers should, in fact, be working to answer.
Second: Are there other, better reasons for rejecting Moral Sensitivity? In this paper, I’ve only argued that results in decision theory shouldn’t convince us to reject Moral Sensitivity; but, as I mentioned in section 5, the conception of rationality assumed by decision theory is a thin, “instrumental” conception. It may turn out that other conceptions of rationality entail the non-existence of rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty, or even entail that there are rational norms requiring that one ignore their moral uncertainty.​[42]​ I have not discussed any of those alternative conceptions of rationality in this paper, in part because it’s difficult to formulate an alternative conception of rationality that permits a clear formulation of (some version of) the problem of value comparison.​[43]​
Third: Are the rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty different from the rational norms governing choice under uncertainty about rationality? If the arguments in this paper are sound, then it may turn out that we should treat moral norms and rational norms very differently. This is because what I’ve argued for in this paper cannot obviously be extended to cases of uncertainty about rational norms; if we were to extend my conclusion in that way, then it would turn out to be possible for someone to rationally choose irrationally.​[44]​ The conclusion that we should treat moral uncertainty differently from uncertainty about rationality would be surprising, since philosophers often assume that all forms of “normative uncertainty” should be treated in the same way.
And fourth: What is the proper account of rational moral motivation under moral uncertainty? I’ve suggested that a morally motivated and morally uncertain person can choose rationally without aiming to maximize expected moral value. But this means that those of us interested in the type of rationality described by decision theory need to develop a compatible account of rational moral motivation.​[45]​
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^1	 	Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1972), 229-243.
^2	 	I will be sloppy in my use of terms like “belief” and “credence,” because my argument can be put in terms of either.
^3	 	There are only three constraints on the content of those propositions: they must be (1)  mutually exclusive, (2) jointly exhaustive, and (3) “independent” of the actions one is choosing between. A set of moral propositions can satisfy all of these constraints. For example: It is sometimes permissible to kill a human and It is never permissible to kill a human.
^4	 	The foregoing argument highlights one source of confusion in Nissan-Rozen’s paper “Against Moral Hedging,” in which (in one section) he argues that dominance-reasoning under moral uncertainty conflicts with the actual rule of dominance. His argument goes astray when he introduces an additional constraint on the propositions that express the states of nature: he asserts that they must be descriptive, by which he means non-moral. All that Nissan-Rozen shows is that dominance reasoning could recommend one action with respect to one partition, but not with respect to another partition. That conclusion only demonstrates that we would need to work with a finer-grained partition that allows us to take into account all of the outcomes that we care about. See Ittay Nissan-Rozen’s “Against Moral Hedging,” Economics and Philosophy Vol. 3 (2015), 1-21.
^5	 	Jacob Ross makes a similar point; see “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” Ethics, Vol. 116, No. 4 (July 2006), 753.
^6	 	Jacob Ross also discusses this position on no-dominance cases; see “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” pp. 753-4.
^7	 	Notice that one can endorse this natural thought without endorsing the view that utility theory describes the decision-making process that one should consciously engage in.
^8	 	Hedden, “Does MITE Make Right? On Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 11, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 102-128.
^9	 	Many have presented this objection and have offered responses to it, all of which Hedden rejects. See:	Hudson, “Subjectivization in Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1989), 221-229;	Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000);	Ross, “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” Ethics, Vol. 116 (2006), 742-68;	Sepielli, “What to Do When You Don’t Know What to Do,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 4, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5-28;	Riedener, Maximizing Expected Value under Axiological Uncertainty, Dissertation, University of Oxford (2015).	Nissan-Rozen also appeals to the problem of value comparison to argue against the view that rational norms are sensitive to one’s moral beliefs. See Nissan-Rozen’s “Against Moral Hedging,” Economics and Philosophy Vol. 3 (2015), 1-21.
^10	 	I assume that the moral propositions are mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, and act-independent.
^11	 	Chang would reject this paraphrase of the definition of comparability, since she endorses the existence of a fourth relation that can hold between sets of alternatives. See Ruth Chang, “Introduction,” Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning,” ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
^12	 	Chang, 2.
^13	 	A lottery is a set of outcomes in which (a) each outcome is paired with a probability and (b) the probabilities in the set equal 1.
^14	 	For a description of axioms close to the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Representation Theorem, see Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (New York: Dover, 1957), especially 23-31.
^15	 	Jacob Ross has a description of how a moral theory can be represented by a utility function; see “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” p. 755.
^16	 	Another way to put the worry: given that a utility function is unique up to positive affine transformation, which transformations of the utility functions (associated with competing moral theories) should we use?
^17	 	Lockhart, 84.
^18	 	This objection to PEMT is not original to Hedden, and has been discussed by Sepielli. See Sepielli’s “Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity among Moral Theories,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 86, No. 3 (2013), 580-589. See also Hedden, p. 110.
^19	 	Sepielli, 2009.
^20	 	Hedden, pp. 111-112.
^21	 	Ross, 2006; Riedener, 2015.
^22	 	Hedden, pp. 113-114.
^23	 	Hedden, pp. 114-120.
^24	 	There are other theories to which we cannot apply representation theorems. For example, a very demanding deontological theory could violate the axiom of continuity.
^25	 	This problem is discussed at length in MacAskill’s “The Infectiousness of Nihilism,” Ethics 123 (April 2013), 508-520.
^26	 	Ross (2006), 763.
^27	 	To put this point in terms of Chang’s notion of a covering value: so long as there is a covering value with respect to which one can compare options, those options are comparable in that respect. See Chang, 1997.
^28	 	They might disagree about the deontic status (permissible, impermissible, obligatory, supererogatory, etc.) of actions, or about some scalar moral value.
^29	 	I want to thank Joshua Schechter for helping me clarify this point.
^30	 	For a basic description of that problem, see Luce and Raiffa, pp. 33-34. It’s already been noted that the problem of value comparison is similar to the problem of interpersonal utility comparison. See Hedden, pp. 8-9 and Sepielli (2009), p. 12 and 27.
^31	 	MacAskill, 510.









^41	 	Up to positive affine transformation.
^42	 	Perhaps a view such as Philippa Foot’s (in “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp 1-14.), or Warren Quinn’s (in “Rationality and Human Good” and “Putting Rationality in its Place,” both in Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)) could provide alternatives to the thin conception of rationality assumed by decision-theorists.
^43	 	Perhaps Tarsney responds to a different formulation of the problem of value comparison (a formulation developed in terms of a different conception of rationality). See Tarsney, “Intertheoretic Value Comparisons: A Modest Proposal,” forthcoming in the Journal of Moral Philosophy.
^44	 	Michael Titelbaum discusses this sort of problem in “Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason),” Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol. 5 (2015), 253-294.
^45	 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